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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff sued the Defendants in fraud and seeking to 
specifically enforce the sale of a home at 275 Gemini Drive, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, based upon the first of two "Earnest Money 
Receipt and Offer to Purchase" documents entered into between the 
parties. (R-2-8) The first document was in an amount of $7,850.00 
less than the second; Plaintiffs purchased the said home based 
upon the second document, then sued for the difference between 
the purchase prices. Third District Judge Jay E. Banks granted 
judgment for the Plaintiffs for fraud and in the amount of 
71,850.00 together with $1,500.00 attorney fees and interest. 
(R-65) Defendants filed a Motion for a New Trial under Rule 
60(b) U.R.C.P. Subsections 1, 2, 6 & 7. (R-82-83) The Court 
denied this Motion. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. Did the first Earnest Money Deposit and Offer to 
Purchase constitute a valid contract between the parties? 
II. Were the additions placed on the said document 
sufficient to constitute a Counteroffer? 
III. Was it fraud for Defendant-Appellant to sign the 
document individually and list it individually? 
IV. Did the Plaintiffs-Respondents perform their 
obligations under the contract? 
V. Did the Defendant-Appellant breach the terms of the 
first Earnest Money Deposit and Offer to Purchase? 
VI. Were any other of the actions of the Defendant-
Appellant fraudulent? 
VII. Is the Judgment as issued more than prayed for 
and not supported by the findings or evidence of damages? 
VIII. Has the Defendant-Appellant met the requirements 
of Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, for the 
following: 
A. Upon motion and upon such terms as are justf the 
Court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his 
legal representative from a final judgmentf order or proceeding/ 
for the following reasons: 
Subsection 1. Mistake inadvertance, surprise, or 
excusable neglect; 
Subsection 2. Newly discovered evidence, which 
by due diligence could not have been discovered in time 
to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b): 
Subsection 6. . . . or it is no longer equitable 
that the judgment should have prospective application; 
Subsection 7. . . . any other reason justifying 
relief from the operation of the judgment . . . 
IX. Was it error for the Third District Court to award 
damages to the Respondents when the newly discovered evidence 
showed that the present value of the second Offer to Purchase, 
was in fact less expensive than the present value of the first 
Offer to Purchase which the Plaintiffs were seeking to 
specifically enforce? 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about April 22, 1977, the Plaintiffs-Respondents made 
an offer, through an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase, 
to purchase certain property owned by Defendant-Appellant, 
consisting of a lot and an unfinished home located at 275 Gemini 
Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah. (Exhibit 1-P) 
The Defendant Myrna E. Marsden had removed herself from the 
case by filing for bankruptcy and the Trial Court so found. (R-
66) Defendant-Appellant had previously listed the property for 
sale with Century 21. Richard D. Lauritzen, a real estate 
salesman, who had had prior dealings with Defendant-Appellant on 
the same and other properties obtained the offer. (R-l-4) 
The offer contained the following terms and conditions: 
1. Purchase price was to be $31,350.00 with $100.00 as 
Earnest Money, and Purchaser to apply for a $29,000.00 
loan. The document does not state how the difference of 
$2,250.00 is to be paid. 
2. The offer was subject to Purchasers obtaining 
financing. 
3. Seller was given three (3) days to make written 
acceptance. 
4. There was no description of what they were offering 
to buy or its current state of completion or what state of 
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completion it was to be in by June 1, 1977, which was the 
possession date. 
5. No names were given with respect to whom the 
property was to be conveyed. 
6. Items to go with the sale if currently attached to 
the premises were as follows: 
i. Plumbing and heating fixtures and 
equipment; 
ii. Water heaters and burners; 
iii. Electric light fixtures, excluding bulbs; 
iv. Bathroom fixtures, roller shades, curtain 
rods and fixtures, Venetian blinds, window and door 
screens, linoleum, all shrubs and trees and any other 
fixtures. (Exhibit 15-P) 
Defendant-Appellant did not accept the offer within the 3 
day period; but made a counter-offer on April 26, 1977 imposing 
certain conditions on the purchasers. (Exhibit 1-P) Purchasers 
did not meet the conditions of the counter-offer within the time 
limit specified. (R-250; 255-257) 
Approximately ten months after entering the second Earnest 
Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase dated June 6, 1978, (Exhibit 
3-P) the Plaintiffs-Respondents commenced suit to specifically 
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enforce the firstf together with damages, both general and 
punative, attorney's fees and costs. (R-2-8) 
Prior to the trial in this litigation, which was in the 
Third District Court, under Civil No. C-79-2873, the Defendant 
had tried earnestly and persistently to obtain from Utah Mortgage 
Loan Corporation and the Federal Housing Administration informa-
tion concerning the loan applications of the Plaintiffs-
Respondents, which formed the basis of the Plaintiffs-Respondents1 
claims against the Defendant-Appellant. (R-96-98) These attempts 
were made through personal visits to the respective offices and 
through phone calls to the offices of the respective agencies. 
(R-96-98) 
Prior to the trial, the Defendant-Appellant herein had 
consistently and persistently been told by the respective loaning 
agencies that the files concerning the Plaintiff-Respondent had 
been destroyed and were not available. This information was 
conveyed to the Defendant-Appellant's attorney of record, and 
both the attorney and the Defendant-Appellant relied upon the 
statements of the respective loaning agencies that the files had 
been destroyed and that the information contained in them was not 
available. (R-96-98; R-475) 
After the trial, the Third District Court, the Honorable 
Judge Jay E. Banks presiding entered a Judgment for the 
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Plaintiffs-Respondents and against the Defendant-Appellant 
essentially for the difference between the two offers in the 
amount of $7,850.00 plus $1,500.00 in attorneys fees and 
interest, on the 3rd day of June, 1980. (R-65) This matter is 
currently on appeal before this Court, based on a Notice of 
Appeal filed on July 2, 1980, under file #17174. (R-85-86) On or 
about the 23rd of June, 1980, the Defendant-Appellant was advised 
by Utah Mortgage Loan Corporation that the Plaintiffs-
Respondents1 file had been discovered and was not in fact 
destroyed. (R-475;96-98) Defendant-Appellant obtained a copy of 
said file from the same and found the following facts: (R-96-98; 
473; 474; 476; 477) 
1. Plaintiff made application to Utah Mortgage Loan 
Corporation on April 25, 1977, for a $29,000.00 loan at 8 
percent interest per annum for 30 years. 
2. Said loan to be secured by a lien on 275 Gemini 
Drive. 
3. The application was made for the purpose of 
obtaining FHA Section 203(b) insured loan. 
4. This loan was not used by plaintiffs since they had 
made down payment on another property. 
5. After cancellation of the Plaintiffs-Respondents 
initial loan under the first Offer to Purchase, the 
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Respondents made an application for a loan from American 
Home Morgage and/or Medal ion Corporation Mortgage Company 
which was an FHA 235 subsidized loanf using one of Marsden's 
Corporations (Defendants' Corporation) reservations 
therefor, thus reducing the interest rate on the second loan 
to 4 percent. This effectively made the present value of 
the second loan which the Respondents accepted and through 
which they purchased the property, better than the present 
value of the first loanf which they rejected even through 
the total purchase price was greater. The first loan 
carried an interest rate of 8 percent, 
6. In effect by accepting the second/ loan, Plaintiffs 
obtained a less expensive loan and were not damaged in 
making that election even though the total purchase price 
was greater. 
Upon receipt of the file from Utah Mortgage Loan 
Corporation, the Appellant made application to the Third 
District Court under Rule 60(b) under the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, for a new trial. (R-82-83) This motion was 
made in a timely manner, was heard by the Honorable Jay E. 
Banks, and was denied and said denial was entered on August 
2, 1985. (R-461-462) 
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A timely Notice of Appeal was made by the Appellants on 
September 3, 1985f (R-463-464) and a Motion to Consolidate this 
Appeal with #17174 has been granted by this Court. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A contract is not formed when prospective purchasers make an 
offer with a 3-day deadline which Seller did not meet. In 
addition, when the conditions of the otter are not met and the 
Seller puts added conditions onto the offer, it then becomes a 
counteroffer and the Court may not exclude certain conditions and 
enforce others so as to form a contract that the parties to the 
contract did not intend, and then specifically enforce it. 
Fraud is not performed where a seller merely admits to 
include his wife's name on the earnest money offer and then 
obtains the wife's signature on the closing documents. To 
establish fraud, damages directly relating to the fraud must be 
estabished. 
What is the measure of damages and how can a Court measure 
them when there is little or no evidence concerning them? Must 
damages be proved? What weight should the Court place on the 
newly-discovered evidence and did the Defendant-Appellant come 
within the perview of Rule 60(b) U.R.C.P. so as to be given a new 
trial to establish the evidence? 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I: DID THE FIRST EARNEST MONEY DEPOSIT AND OFFER TO 
PURCHASE CONSTITUTE A VALID CONTRACT BETWEEN THE 
PARTIES. 
There is no doubt from the record that the Plaintiffs, in 
combination with Mr. Lauritzen, drew up and offered to purchase 
the lot and home located at 275 Gemini Drive, Salt Lake City, (R-
243). The terms and conditions of the offer are spelled out on 
exhibit 15-P. However, on exhibit 15-P the lines where the 
Defendant as Seller should have signed are empty. He never 
accepted the offer within the 3-day period specified on exhibit 
15-P. These lines were in fact never signed by Defendant on any 
ot the multiple Earnest Money Offers that were made. Marsden 
never in fact accepted the various offers of Gerrards' without 
adding conditions (1-P; 3-P; 13-D & 14-D). Exhibit 1-P was 
changed by Marsden and a counteroffer was made. Among the terms 
and conditions imposed in the counteroffer were (1) Required that 
$2,250.00 be paid to Utah Management; (2) Tentative Approval by 
Loan Company had to be within seven days (by May 3, 1977); (3) 
Approval had to be in writing; and (4) Time is of the essence. 
That the Gerrards did not meet the burden of these 
conditions is clear from the record. Lauritzen testified that he 
knew that the loan had not been tentatively approved by May 3 (R-
256) and that the Gerrards did not tender the purchase price 
-9-
within the designated time period. (R-257) The Gerrards 
themselves admitted the same (R-310). Therefore, while the 
Gerrards claimed to have accepted the conditions imposed by 
Marsden (R-262) they were not able to perform. Lauritzen 
testified that the written signatures of acceptance were even in 
doubt and were not signed until nine months after the counter-
offer by Marsden (R-255). That this acceptance came too late is 
obvious from the terms contained on Exhibit 1-P. How can time be 
of the essence it the acceptance comes 9 months later. It 
follows then that in the first instance there was no timely 
acceptance of the counteroffer, and secondly if it is conceivable 
that there was, there was no timely performance therefore no 
binding agreement between the parties. This Court held in 
Ephriam Theatre Co. v. Hawk, 321 P.2d 221, 7 Utah 2d 163. 
The purpose of contract is to reduce to writing the 
conditions upon which the minds of the parties have met 
and to fix their rights and duties in respect thereto, 
and intent so expressed is to be found, if possible, 
within the four corners of instrument itself in 
accordance with ordinary accepted meaning of words 
used. (at page 223 of P.2d) 
Appellant submits that there was no timely meeting of the 
minds between the parties to the contract found on Exhibit 1-P. 
In keeping with this meeting of the minds requirement is the 
case of Jensen v. Bouwhuis, 577 P.2d 55 (Utah 1978). There this 
Court held, in a case very similar to the case at bar, involving 
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the specific performance of an Earnest Money and Offer to 
Purchase Agreement which had a deadline of March 1, 1976. 
The purchaser never offered to buy the entire tract of 
land until months after the seller had renounced the 
deal. There never was a valid contract made andf 
therefore, no specific performance could be decreed, 
(at page 559) 
In the instant case, Marsden testified that he repudiated 
the offer on several different occasions. Firstly, there was a 
repudiation in fact because Marsden never received Exhibit 1-P 
signed and returned to him or Lauritzen within the 3-day time 
period (R-378). Secondly, on the 26th of April, 1977, he told 
Gerrards that it was repudiated (R-373-374; 402; 406; 407) if 
they did not act. This together with the fact that Gerrards 
never signed and accepted the counteroffer until the Spring of 
1978 (R-37 3) and even submitted it to the loan company without 
signing it (R-408) indicates a non-agreement, a failure of the 
meeting of the minds and a repudication of the counteroffer. 
Especially if the term "time is of the essence" is to mean 
anything. 
By specifically enforcing exhibit 1-P the trial court is in 
effect re-negotiating the sale of the home between the parties. 
That this should not be done is clear from Carlson v. Hamilton, 
332 P.2d 989, 8 Utah 2d 272, where this Court stated 
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It is not the function of the Court to renegotiate a 
contract of the parties. 
Or for that matter "even if the contract is a bad bargain," 
Carlson, supra. And even if the "contract is ill advised and 
burdensome, court cannot make a new contract for the parties." 
Tooele City v. Settlement Canyon Irr. Co., 291 P.2d. 881, 4 Utah 
2d 215. 
The Court has reiterated these principles in Bekins Bar V 
Ranch v. Hath, 664 P.2d 455 (Utah 1983) when it stated: 
With a few exceptions, it is still axiomatic in 
contract law that "[p]ersons dealing at arm's length 
are entitled to contract on their own terms without the 
intervention of the courts for the purpose of relieving 
one side or the other from the effects of a bad 
bargain." Biesinger v. Behunin, Utah, 584 P.2d 801, 803 
(1978). Parties "should be permitted to enter into 
contracts that actually may be unreasonable or which 
may lead to hardship on one side." Carlson v. Hamilton, 
8 Utah 2d 272, 275, 332 P.2d 989, 991 (1958). Although 
courts will not be parties to enforcing flagrantly 
unjust agreements, it is not for the courts to assume 
the paternalistic role of declaring that one who has 
freely bound himself need not perform because the 
bargain is not favorable. 
In the Bekins case, supra, the plaintiff was seeking to avoid the 
foreclosure on his ranch on the basis that among other things 
interest rates charged him on loans obtained using the ranch as 
collateral were unconscionable. But this Court made him adhere 
to his contract. Appellant submits that Plaintiffs-Respondents 
should be made to adhere to their contract for the purchase of 
this home; to wit, exhibit 3-P. 
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POINT II: IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO SPECIFICALLY ENFORCE 
THE FIRST EARNEST MONEY OFFER 
The trial Court concluded as a matter of law that the 
Gerrards were entitled to Specific Performance of the first 
Earnest Money Offer to Purchase Agreement (R-78). Yet the law of 
this state on specific performance would not justify such a 
conclusion. In the Fischer v. Johnson, 525 P.2d 45 (Utah 1974) 
case this Court held 
In order to claim specific performance, a party must 
either perform or tender performance in accordance with 
the covenants in his contract. 
In Fischer (supra) the matter involved, like the case on 
appeal, the specific performance of an Earnest Money Agreement 
signed in the expectation of the sale of the Restaurant known as 
the "Quail Run," in Salt Lake County. Similar to the case at 
bar, the prospective purchasers, as an excuse for nonperformance 
in a timely manner claimed that the sellers had made themselves 
unavailable, had left town, and thus made the closing impossible. 
Purchasers argued that they had made every effort to contact 
sellers and were ready and willing to perform. In dispensing 
with this argument this Court held: 
We appreciate the correctness of the plaintiffs' 
assertion: that under usual circumstances one party to 
a contract (such as defendants) cannot act designedly 
to make it difficult or impossible for the other party 
to perform, then invoke a defense of nonperformance. 
But it is also true that specific performance is a 
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remedy of equity; and one who invokes it must have 
clean hands in having done equity himself. That is, he 
must take care to discharge his own duties under the 
contract; and he cannot rely on any mere inconvenience 
as an excuse tor his failure to do so. Even if 
inconvenience or difficulty is encountered, he must 
make an effort to perform, or to tender performance, 
which manifests reasonable diligence and a bona fide 
desire to keep his own promises. 
1. Cummings v. Nielsen, 42 Utah 157, 129 P. 619. 
2. See Wimer v. Wagner, 323 Mo. 1156, 20 S. W.2d 650, 
79 A.L.R. 1231; Kinberger v. Drouct, 149 La. 986, 90 
So. 367; Maughlin v. Perry, 35 Md. 352; and see 
annotation, 147 A.L.R. 1312. 
Appellant submits that the Fischer case, supra is 
controlling in this matter. 
The facts in the instant case are very similar to Fischer, 
supra, if this Court believes that the Gerrards in fact accepted 
Marsden's counteroffer (exhibit 1-P); but failed to perform the 
requirements of the counteroffer. (R-256; R-257; R-310) and 
therefore, must find themselves in the same position as the 
purchasers in the Fischer case, supra, with the same result. The 
only possible difference is that in Lauritzen's opinion the 
"tentative loan approval in writing" could not be obtained within 
the seven day time period contained in the counteroffer (R-
258). Lauritzen's expertise to claim this is not established in 
the record, but Marsden claimed that based upon his business 
experiance, he had obtained loans within seven days and at the 
-14-
time he wrote the conditions of the counteroffer that he thought 
the Gerrards could too (R-44 3). Further, that he needed the 
assurance of the tentative acceptance by the loaning institution 
so that he could expend the time and effort to get the house 
ready by June 1, 1977; without which he was not prepared to move 
forward (R-334). In reverting these facts to the applicable 
principles of law the Appellant agrees with this Court in the 
Fischer case, supra, when it said: 
There is undoubtedly a basis in the evidence to justify 
a conclusion that the actions of the defendants created 
some degree of difficulty or inconvenience for the 
plaintiffs. Nevertheless, we cannot see therein any 
basis upon which it could reasonably be concluded that 
the plaintiffs discharged the duty which the law 
imposes upon them of attempting with reasonable 
diligence and good faith to do what the agreement 
required of them. They did not fulfill that obligation 
by simply serving the notice of willingness to go 
forward, and yet failing to tender the required $3,000 
payment. 
This court has held in a number of cases that in order 
to claim specific performance, a party must either 
perform or tender performance, in accordance with the 
covenants in his contract: See Nance v. Schoonover, 
Utah, 521, P.2d 896: Sieverts v. White, 2 Utah 2d 351, 
273 P.2d 974: Coombs v. Ouzounian, 24 Utah 2d 39, 465 
P.2d 356. 
The transcript is void of any attempts by the Gerrards to 
obtain the seven day tentative loan approval, other than one 
visit to the loan company with Lauritzen (R-245), and a phone 
call or two thereafter. (R-264) If in reality they had accepted 
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Marsden's counteroffer, they made little or no attempt to try to 
comply with it, or yet an extension. Therefore, the Gerrards 
having failed to put themselves in a position to enforce the 
agreement, the judgment of the District Court should be reversed 
and the case remanded. 
POINT III: IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO FIND THAT THE APPELLANT 
HAD COMMITTED FRAUD BY LISTING HIMSELF AS SELLER OF 
THE PROPERTY. 
In its Findings of Fact (R-76) the trial court found fraud 
on the part of Appellant for listing himself individually as the 
seller on exhibit 1-P. That the Appellant listed himself 
individually is not contested; but does this establish fraud? In 
the landmark case of Pace v. Parrish, 247 P.2d 273, 122 Utah 141, 
this court held: 
Elements of actionable fraud to be proved are a false 
representation of existing material fact, made 
knowingly or recklessly for the purpose of inducing 
reliance thereon, upon wnich plaintiff reasonably 
relies to his injury. 
Emphasis should be placed upon the language "Upon which 
Plaintiff reasonably relies to his injury." Where is the 
injury to the Gerrards by Marsden placing his name on 
exhibit 1-P individually, rather than together with his 
wife's? When the time came for the actual sale of the house 
based upon a meeting of the minds, Appellant had no trouble 
getting his wife's signature on the proper documents to 
-16-
convey title and accept the offer, (exhibits 3-P; 10-D; 13-
D) Surely this act was simply an oversight on the part of 
Marsden which caused absolutely no harm or damage whatsoever 
to Respondents. Which of the Respondents alleged damages 
flow from their reliance upon the fact that Marsden had 
listed himself individually as the seller? Appellant 
testified that the land had been purchased from a closely 
held corporation by he and his wife (R-313). That he had 
done all of the negotiating on the transaction for his wife 
(R-314) and that the Corporation would do the building (R-
314-315). Therefore, since Appellant was acting for the 
corporation as the builder and had negotiated the purchase 
of the land for his wife, from the corporation, it was a 
natural harmless error not to list his wife on 1-P, and not 
the kind of error for which a finding of fraud should stand. 
The evidence shows that the real problem in this case 
was the mistaken belief on the part of Respondents that they 
could still purchase the home according to the terms and 
conditions of exhibit 1-P without themselves performing 
their part. (R-262; 264) A phone call or two was the extent 
of their effort to get the loan approval required by exhibit 
1-P (R-264). 
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Under these conditions this Court has held in the 
Meagher v. Uintah Gas Co., 255 P.2d 989f 123 Utah 123, 
Actionable fraud will not lie where one is induced to 
change his position, not because of any practiced 
deceit, but because of his own mistake. 
In Meagher, supra, the Court was dealing with an owner of land 
who had misread and misunderstood a legal document and the Court 
refused to help him on that basis. Appellant submits that on the 
same basis the trial court should not have helped Respondents and 
for the same reasons. 
POINT IV: IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO FIND THAT THE APPELLANT 
BY HIS ACTIONS DELAYED THE APPROVAL OF THE LOAN. 
The record in this case just does not support this finding 
number 12 by the trial court. (R-77) Lauritzen testified that 
Appellant got the appraisal increased (R-247). He also testified 
that the loan was delayed because the house had not been 
appraised. (R-251) Whose duty it was to obtain and pay for an 
appraisal the record does not show; nor do the exhibits for they 
all remain silent on this subject. The Trial Court could have 
just as readily concluded that it was Plaintiff's obligation to 
obtain the Appraisal as it was the defendants, especially if it 
was a loan requirement. However, Appellant sheds light on the 
system and how appraisals are arrived at by explaining that the 
house consisted of a basic plan and alternatives. (R-355) The 
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number of alternatives in a given home determined the value of 
the house. Therefore, it is logical that before the loaning 
institution would loan money on a home, they had to know how many 
alternatives there were installed. That Marsden tried to get ths 
information to the Loan Institute is established by the fact he 
was at Gerrard's home 2 days after March 26, to get their choice 
on alternates for the home. This logical and necessary process 
is what the District Court concluded to be the delaying of the 
loan approval by Appellant. While Appellant acknowledges the 
latitude allowed trial courts its findings must have competant 
evidence to support them, Farrell v. Turner, 482 P.2d 117, 25 
Utah 2d 351. "Without competent evidence to support the trial 
courts' findings, this Court will not hesitate to exercise its 
prerogative to substitute its own judgment." Penrose v. Penrose, 
656 P.2d 1017. (Utah 1982) 
POINT V: THAT THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT BECAUSE THE 
FIRST OFFER WAS LESS IN TERMS OF GROSS DOLLARS THAN 
THE SECOND PLAINTIFFS HAD BEEN DAMAGED. 
In its findings (R-78) the trial court concluded that 
because the first offer was for $31,350.00 and the actual sale 
was for $39,200.00 approximately one year later, that the 
Plaintiffs were entitled to a judgment for the difference. This 
does not follow, and does not flow from the evidence produced at 
trial. According to exhibit 2-P the loan that Plaintiffs 
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obtained according to the statement on Exhibit 1-P was an FHA 
loan for $29,000.00 at 8 percent to run for 30 years. 
According to exhibit 3-P Plaintiffs were to obtain an FHA 
235 loan for $38,000, but to run at only 4 percent interest and 
defendant would pay all closing costs over $600.00. It does not 
take a mathematical genius to calculate that the $38,000.00 loan 
at 4 percent is a much less expensive loan over the 30 year 
period than the $29,000.00 loan at 8 percent. When this was 
brought to the trial courts' attention, an interesting but 
erroneous conclusion was reached by the judge as follows. (R-444 
& 445) 
MR. DUDD: See, Judge, the thing that isn't in evidence 
is the Court has no evidence presented by the 
plaintiffs as to what the terms of the loans were. 
Now, were they borrowing money under the first loan at 
eight percent? It could pay out a lot more money if 
they were borrowing under the second loan at five 
percent. 
THE COURT: The interest didn't go down. It went up. 
MR. DODD: You don't know that. 
THE COURT: You've been around here long enough to know 
that. 
MR. DODD: What I'm saying is damages have to be 
proved. The Court cannot assume payments. 
Appeallant submits that from the very same documents that 
the Court concluded that the interest rates went up, they in fact 
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show that they went down (Exhibit 2-P; 3-P); thus the Plaintiffs 
were not damaged by buying the home under the second offer, 
POINT VI: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
A NEW TRIAL 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure clearly 
allows relief from a final judgment as follows: 
60(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly 
Discovered Evidence; Fraud, Etc. On motion and upon such 
terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of 
justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following 
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect; (2) newly discovered evidenced which by due 
diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for 
a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore 
denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or 
other midsconduct of an adverse party; (4) when, for any 
cause the summons in an action has not been personally 
served upon the defendant as requied by Rule 4(e) and the 
defendant has failed to appear in said action; (5) the 
judgment is void; (6) the judgment has been satisfied, 
released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it 
is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is 
not longer equitable that the judgment should have 
prospective application; or (7) any other reason justifying 
relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall 
be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), 
(3), or (4), not more than three months after the judgment, 
order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under 
this subdivision (b) does not affect the finality oif a 
judgment or suspend its operation. This Rule does not limit 
the power of a court to entertain an independent action to 
relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to 
set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The 
procedure for obtaining any relif from a judgment shall be 
by motion as prescribed in these Rules or by an independent 
action. 
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Defendant filed his motion in a timely and proper manner (R-
82; R-471) and was supported by an affidavit of Marsden (R-96-
98). The Plaintiffs filed no opposing affidavits. In his 
affidavit the Appellant stated the following facts: 
3. That prior to the trial in the above-entitled matter the 
Defendant had tried earnestly and persistently to obtain 
from UTAH MORTGAGE LOAN CORPORATION and the FEDERAL HOUSING 
ADMINISTRATION information concerning the loan applications 
of the Plaintiffs, which formed the basis of the Plaintiffs 
claim against the Defendant. These attempts were made 
through personal visits and phone calls to the offices of 
the said loaning agencies respectively. 
4. That the Defendant herein had consistently and 
persistently been told by the said loaning agencies that the 
files concerning the Plaintiffs had been destroyed and were 
therefore not available. 
5. That the Defendant conveyed this to his attorney of 
record, and both the said Defendant and his attorney herein 
relied upon statements of the said loaning agencies that the 
files had been destroyed and that the information contained 
in them was not available. 
6. Based on this reliance and the absence of the evidence 
contained in the files, the above-entitled court rendered 
its decision against the Affiant herin. 
7. On or about the 23rd of June, 1980, the Defendant was 
advised by Utah Mortgage Loan Corporation that the 
Plaintiff's file had been discovered and was not in fact 
destroyed. Defendant obtained a copy of said file and from 
the same found the following facts: 
A. Plaintiffs made application to Utah Mortgage Loan 
Corporation on April 25, 1977 for a $29,000.00 loan at 
8% interest per annum for 30 years. 
B. Said loan to be secured by Lien on 275 Gemini 
Drive. 
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C. The application was made for the purpose of 
obtaining an F.ri.A. Section 203(b) Insured Loan. 
D. This loan was not used by Plaintiffs, since they 
had made downpayment on another property. 
8. After the cancellation of this loan the Plaintiffs then 
obtained a loan from American Home Mortgage and/or Medallion 
Mortgage Company which was an F.H.A. 235 subsidized loan 
using one of Marsden Corporation's reservations, therefore, 
this reduced the interest rate of the loan to 4%. This 
effectively made the present value of the second loan, which 
plaintiffs accepted, better than the present value of the 
first loan, which they rejected, even though the total 
purchase price was greater. 
9. In effect by accepting the second loan the Plaintiffs 
obtained a less expensive loan and were not damaged thereby. 
10. Defendant also found from the Utah Mortgage Loan 
Corporation file that there was a substantial amount less 
consideration to the Plaintiffs with April 1977 Earnest 
Money Agreement/Utah Mortgage Loan Corporation loan 
application than with final Earnest Money Agreement/loan 
application. 
11. The Plaintiffs were bettered financially by the final 
Earnest Money Agreement. 
In its motion for the new trial the Appellant claimed that 
it was made pursuant to subsections 1, 2, 6 and 7 of Rule 60(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (R-82). 
At the time of the hearing Defendant requested to put on 
evidence (R-472); but the trial court instructed only a protfer, 
to which the Plaintiffs did not object (R-473). Under the 
profter the Defendant submitted the following: 
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1. The evidence would show that the record loan that 
Plaintiffs obtained and purchased the house with was in fact 
cheaper than the first loan that was obtained (R-473). 
2. That the first loan obtained was for 8% interest and the 
record for 4% interest. Therefore the second loan even 
though it was for approximately $7r500 more was a cheaper 
loan for Plaintiffs (R-474). 
3. That Defendant obtained the cheaper loan for the 
Plaintiffs and it was a 235 F.H.A. loan (R-474). 
4. That the evidence showed that Plaintiffs had in fact 
withdrawn their application for the first loan and were not 
awarded it (R-474). 
5. That the Plaintiffs suffered no damage by using the 
second loan at 4% as opposed to the first at 8% (R-476). 
6. That Plaintiffs ended up with a better house, with more 
extras in it at a cheaper price (R-476-477). 
In its order denying the Defendant's motion the trial court 
never stated why it had made its decision (R-461-462). 
Rule 6Q(D)(2) In applying the above facts to the applicable 
language of the Rule we find that there was in fact "newly 
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been 
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b)." 
Appellants affidavit (R-96-98) clearly indicates that the 
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respective loaning institutions told him they had been 
destroyed. At the trial the Plaintiffs, when asked, could not 
state that they had documents (R-43) or knew the terms and 
conditions of the first loan (R-53) and therefore the only place 
to get the correct information was at the loaning institutions. 
When this information was obtained, it clearly showed the 
difference between the two loans and the fact that the second 
loan was financially advantageous to the Plaintiffs and they 
suffered no damages thereby. Appellants submit that under the 
language of Rule 60(b) the trial court should have allowed a new 
trial based upon newly discovered evidence. 
Rule 60(b)(1) The record also shows that the Appellant 
represented himself in nearly all of the discovery processes 
(R-13; R-33; R-38; R25-28) and only retained counsel fourteen 
days before trial (R-43), thus not allowing sufficient time in 
which to allow discovery. This was done through the Defendant's 
lack of knowledge of the legal system, misunderstanding of the 
laws of this state and represents inadvertence and/or exccusable 
neglect. This prevented the Appellant from timely retaining 
counsel and thus avoiding procedural difficulties. As this Court 
held in Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co. 260 P.2d 741, 123 U 416. 
The allowance of a vacation of a judgement is a 
creature of equity designed to relieve against harshness of 
enforcing a judgment, which may occur through procedural 
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difficulties, the wrongs of the opposing party, or 
misfortunes which prevent the presentation of a claim or 
defense. 
Where the newly discovered shows that the Plaintiffs have 
not in fact been damaged, the harshness of the $9,350.00 
judgement is apparent. 
Rule 60(b) 6 & 7 The Appellant submits that the judgement 
is unjust upon its face in that the Plaintiffs received what they 
bargained for (exhibit 3-P) and that the newly discovered 
evidence proves the inequity of the trial courts decision. The 
facts before the trial court on the motion indicate clearly that 
the Plaintiffs received a better home, a cheaper loan, and 
therefore were not damaged (R-96-98; R-473; 474; 476; 477) 
Therefore, on the basis of equity, it is now unjust to enforce a 
judgement of $9,350.00 which is now not merited. The trial court 
should have granted Defendant's motion, allowed the new evidence 
in and then made its decision as to damages. 
Conclusion 
Based upon the forgoing, the Appellant, Roger Marsden, 
respectfully requests that the judgement of the trial court be 
vacated and a new trial be ordered and that the order of the 
trial court denying Defendant's motion under Rule 60(b) be 
reversed and the case remanded for trial. 
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Respectfully submitted, 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PATRICK L. and SHARON K. 
GERRARD, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ROGER J. P. and MYRNA E. 
MARSDEN, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
6-3. -* S-'*„,u, 
Civil No. C-79-2873 
This action came on for trial before the court, the 
Honorable J. E. Banks presiding, and the having been duly 
tried and the judge having previously entered his Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is therefore 
ORDERED, JUDGED AND DECREED that the plaintiffs are 
entitled to specific performance of the April 26, 1977, earnest 
money. It is further ordered, judged, and decreed that the 
defendant Roger J. P. Marsden shall pay the plaintiffs the 
sum of $7,850.00. 
It is further ordered and adjudged that the plaintiffs 
recover of the defendant the sum of $9,350.00 with interest 
thereon at the rate of 8% per annum as provided by law and 
their costs of action incurred herein. 
DATED this jg day of May, 1980. 
BY THE COURT 
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Proposed Loan Amount %J^^Jt^r€' ~ t *° *>* secured by first lien on property 
«' &7G <£ ^(nti«*U-mmAJ£L _ _ • 
FHA Loan for
 x# n yra. Interest rate y X 
VA Loan for yrs. Interest rate X 
.Conventional Loan for yrs. Interest rate I 
Principal and Interest $ ^?A£% & t* 
Hazard Insurance (Fire/Flood) $ 7.+-o 
*«*«• $ ^fL.SL^ 
PMI or FHA Insurance $ j fr. Q ^
 ir 
Other $ 
TOTAL ESTIMATED MONTHLY PAYMENT $ ^ A *. *-«* 
ADVANCE DISCLOSURE OF SETTLEMENT COSTS 
This list gives an estimate of most of the charges you will have to pay at the 
settlement of your loan. The figures shown, aa estimates, are subject to change 
The figures shown are computed based on the aalea price and proposed mortgage f 
amount stated in your application. 
•" ^ 
901 Loan Origination Fee . . . . . . . . . . $ **?<?/). *-0 
$02 f Loan Discount. • • . <<JL<LJLA**~* . M.Yi $ jp^+ji*jsro *~~— 
803 Appralaal Fee $ ^*~*. +-o " * 
804 Credit Report $ /.^i^-o 
805 Lenders Inspection Fee $ «* 
808 Tax Service. ..• .$ ;.. 
810 FNMA Processing Fee $ A 
901 Interest (The maximum you could be required to ^ **- '?] 
nay based on your application) . . . .$ ^/y.^.*rj*y
 1 
902 Mortgage Insurance Ptemfum • $ * 
1101 Settlement or Closing Fee $ 
1105 Document Preparation Fee . . . . •JLLAJLH* . . .S ^^r.—A *-—T 
1109 Title Insurance $ /A / o-O 
1201 Recording Feci* • $ ~f*. o~Q _ 
1301 Survey 5 
Other: 
First year's hazard insurance premium $ f+4.trG 
Hazard insurance reserve ( /2b mos) $ £*.
 f|< «i ** yx/ ** 
Property tax reserve ( A . mos) $ -*na.0~e> 
FHA or PMI insurance reserve ( / mos) S Ji,.<?^ 
TOTAL ESTIMATED C LOS INC COSTS $ *& * 9f, 7 2L 
THIS FORM MAY NOT COVER AIX ITEMS YOU WILL BE REQUIRED TO PAY IN CASH AT SETTLEMENT. 
YOU MAY WISH TO INQUIRE AS TO THE AMOUNTS OF SUCH OTHER ITEMS. YOU MAY BE REQUIRED 
TO PAY OTHER ADDITIONAL AMOUNTS AT SETTLEMENT. 
ESTIMATED DISCOUNT POINTS TO BE PAID BY SELLER (?$)* $ tA.m.jrO 
• M,*+~' 
Received a copy of the foregoing estimated settlement cos t s , and the b o o k l e t , ' ; ^ ; 
"Your Culde to Settlement Costs" this _n £3tL day of ftfj*D . , 19 7 7 »£; 
Applicant Applicant 
*-"• 'Loon Offlcer-Indervlevt 
fTTuKHprT^ 
I for « * « ^ I 
Thorn D. Roberts - #2773 of 
ROBERTS & ROBERTS 
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f s 
10 West 300 South, Su i t e 400 
S a l t Lake C i t y , UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 363-3550 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
PATRICK L. and SHARON K. 
GERRARD, 
) ORDER DENYING MOTION 
P l a i n t i f f , ) POR NEW TRIAL 
vs. ) 
) C i v i l No. C79-2873 
ROGER J . P. AND MYRNA E. ) 
MARSDEN, ) Judge Jay E. Banks 
Defendants . ) 
The a b o v e - e n t i t l e d matter having come before the above-
e n t i t l e d Court, the Honorable Jay E.Banks p r e s i d i n g , and Defendant 
Roger J . P. Marsden's Motion f o r a New Tr ia l under Rule 60(b) of 
the Utah Rules of C i v i l Procedure, and the Court having heard the 
arguments of c o u n s e l , and reviewed the matter submitted t h e r e t o , 
and being f u l l y advised in the premises , i t i s hereby 
ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED t h a t the Defendant's 
a
^ ? ' N CLERK'S OFFICE 
w i uk* Coin*4*/ r«2h 
AUG 2 1985 
- V J L ^«t i»w ,st Court 
Otou'v C>*-v 
Motion for a New Trial shall be and the same is hereby denied 
DATED this ^^day of Jtti?', 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
Approved as to form: 
VGRAHAM DODD 
f &*~*^ 
JUDgt #sy E. BANKS 
District Court Judge 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HINDLEY 
Puffin 
Clerk 
Deputy Clark 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER DENYING NOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL was mailed, 
postage prepaid, on this day of July, 1985, to the following: 
Mr. Graham Dodd 
Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell 
Attorneys for Defendants 
330 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
2?2»*ji~. <2 /?S/>M _^ 
KIRTON A McCONKIE 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
330 S THIRD EAST 
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 
Graham Dodd 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Attorney for Defendant 
330 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 521-3680 
o 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PATRICK L. GERRARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROGER J. P. MARSDEN, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE 
AND/OR ENTRY 
Civil No. C 79-2873 
COMES NOW Graham Dodd, and notifies the above entitled 
Court that he has been retained to represent the Defendants herein 
and therefore notifies the Court of his appearance for and in 
behalf of the Defendants. 
DATED on this /*T day of April, 1980. 
^iOBraham Dodd 
Attorney for Defendant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Notice of Appearance and/or Entry was mailed to Thorn 
Roberts, Attorney for Plaintiffs, 10 West Broadway, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111, on this the 
Ck /9s day of A p r i l , 1980. 
03 
KIRTOM ft McCONKIE 
\H. ~H 
GRAHAM DODD 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Attorneys at Law 
330 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Telephone: 521-3680 
84111 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PATRICK L. and SHARON K. 
GERRARD, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ROGER J. P. and MYRNA E. 
MARSDEN, 
Defendents. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
ROGER J. P. MARSDEN 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
FOR NEW TRIAL. 
Civil No. C-79-2873 
COMES NOW the Defendant above-named ROGER J. P. MARSDEN, 
and for purpose of making this Affidavit part of the record of 
the above-entitled case, states and deposes under oath as follows: 
1. That he is one of the Defendants in the above-
entitled matter. 
2. That a final judgment was entered against him on 
the 3rd day of June, 1980, in the above-entitled matter. 
3. That prior to the trial in the above-entitled matter 
the Defendant had tried earnestly and persistently to obtain from 
UTAH MORTGAGE LOAN CORPORATION and the FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINI-
STRATION information concerning the loan applications of the 
Plaintiffs, which formed the basis of the Plaintiffs claim against 
the Defendant. These attempts were made through personal visits 
and phone calls to the offices of the said loaning agencies 
respectively. 
4. That the Defendant herein had consistently and 
persistently been told by the said loaning agencies that the 
files concerning the Plaintiffs had been destroyed and were i 
therefore not available. 
5. That the Defendant conveyed this to his attorney of 
record, and both the said Defendant and his attorney herein relied 
upon statements of the said loaning agencies that the files had 
been destroyed and that the information contained in them was not 
available. 
6. Based on this reliance and the absence of the 
evidence contained in the files, the above-entitled court rendered 
its decision against the Affiant herein. 
7. On or about the 23rd of June, 1980, the Defendant 
was advised by Utah Mortgage Loan Corporation that the Plaintiff's 
file had been discovered and was not in fact destroyed. 
Defendant obtained a copy of said file and from the same found the 
following facts: 
A. Plaintiffs made application to Utah Mortgage 
Loan Corporation on April 25, 1977 for a $29,000.00 
loan at 8% interest per annum for 30 years. 
B. Said loan to be secured by Lien on 275 Gemini 
Drive. 
C. The application was made for the purpose of 
obtaining an F.H.A. Section 203(b) Insured Loan. 
D. This loan was not used by Plaintiffs, since 
they had made downpayment on another property. 
8. After the cancellation of this loan the 
Plaintiffs then obtained a loan from American Home Mortgage and/or 
Medallion Mortgage Company which was an F.H.A. 235 subsidized 
loan using one of Marsden Corporation's reservations, therefore, 
this reduced the interest rate of the loan to 4%. This 
effectively made the present value of the second loan, which 
Plaintiffs accepted, better than the present value of the first 
loan, which they rejected, even though the total purchase price 
was greater. 
-2- 97 
10. In effect by accepting the second loan the 
Plaintiffs obtained a less expensive loan and were not damaged 
thereby. 
11. Defendant also found from the Utah Mortgage Loan 
Corporation file that there was a substantial amount less consid-
eration to the Plaintiffs with April 1977 Earnest Money Agreement/ 
Utah Mortgage Loan Corporation loan application than with final 
Earnest Money Agreement/loan application. 
12. The Plaintiffs were bettered financially by the 
final Earnest Money Agreement. 
Further, your Affiant saith not. 
DATED on this the JL& day of ^ 4 ^ ^ , 1980 
ROGER J.'T. M/ ARSDEN 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) ss 
5* 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to me this the £b day of 
^ZciCd^lt , 1980. 
<7 
My commission expires: 
J^L }J* VOTARY P U B L I C . ^ R e s i d i n g a t : 
KIRTON ft McCONKIE | 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
fan c Tuion C A C T 
M ' 
Thorn D. Roberts, of 
ROBERTS, BLACK & DIBBLEE 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
10 West 300 South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 363-3550 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County, Utah 
JUN 51960 
W. Stating Evsns. Clerk 3rd Oitt Court 
By . 
f>e*Jty C!*cK 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PATRICK L. and SHARON K. 
GERRARD, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ROGER J. P. and MYRNA E. 
MARSDEN, 
Defendants. 
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. C-79-2873 
The above entitled matter, having come on regularly 
for trial on the 28th day of April, 1980, the plaintiffs 
appearing in person and through their counsel, Thorn D. Roberts, 
and the defendant Roger J. P. Marsden appearing personally 
and through counsel, Graham Dodd, and the parties having 
presented evidence and the Court, being fully advised in the 
premises and previously having surveyed the Plaintiff's pro-
posed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and argument 
having been heard on Defendant's Motion Objecting to Findings 
of Fact and to Modify, the Court hereby makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That the plaintiffs and defendant were residents 
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah and that the cause of 
action was with regard to a piece of real property located in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. The defendant Roger J. P. Marsden was one of 
the joint owners and was the builder of a house located at 
275 North Gemini Drive, Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. 
RDICRTS I U C K * DlSSLEE 
A T T D « N l ¥ S AT LAW 
I U I T I 4SO T C * •NOAOWA-r • U ' i . O ' M a 
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3. That the defendant Myrna E. Marsden previous to 
the date of the trial filed a chapter 13 proceeding in Bankruptcy 
Court and this action proceeded to trial only as against 
defendant Roger J. P. Marsden. 
4. That on or about April 26, 1977, the plaintiffs 
offered to purchase the house and property located at 275 
Gemini Drive from the defendant, Roger J. P. Marsden. 
5. That Mr. Richard B. Lauritzen of Lauritzen and 
Associates undertook to sell the property of the Defendant 
Roger J. P. Marsden which had been previously listed at a 
Century 21 office and thereby became the Defendant Roger J. P. 
Marsden's agent and real estate agent for this transaction. 
6. That on April 26, 1977, the defendant clarified 
the offer of the plaintiffs and directed his agent to return 
it to the plaintiffs. 
7. That the clarification by the defendant Roger J. P. 
Marsden contained no additional material requirements of the 
plaintiffs such as to constitute a counteroffer. 
8. That the condition of tentative approval in 
writing by the bank as contained in the earnest money dated 
April 26, 1977, was told to the defendant Roger J. P. Masden 
to be impossible by Mr. Lauritzen and was impossible under 
the circumstances of this case and the defendant Roger J. P. 
Marsden then directed Mr. Lauritzen to deliver the agreement 
to the plaintiffs. 
9. That the defendant fraudulently listed himself 
individually as the seller of the property and so informed 
his agent, Mr. Lauritzen. 
10. That the plaintiffs relied on said representations 
as the seller throughout the entire transaction. 
11. That the plaintiffs immediately agreed to the 
clarification of the defendant and did all things required 
under the contract as expressed by the earnest money, the 
defendant and his agent, there being no additional burden or 
ROBERTS BLACK & D lBBLEE 
f ^ 
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requirements of the Plaintiffs, the plaintiffs were not 
required to immediately sign said earnest money. 
12. That the defendant prior to May 3, 1977, actively 
worked with Utah Mortgage Loan Company with whom plaintiffs 
were required to make loan application with regard to processing 
plaintiff's loan application and.the appraisal on the property 
and by his actions delayed the approval of the loan by the 
bank to the plaintiffs. 
13. That at all times the plaintiffs were ready, 
willing and able to comply with the terms and conditions of 
the contract and the earnest money as expressed by the defendant. 
14. That the Plaintiffs used all due and diligent 
efforts to effectuate the terms and conditions of the agreement. 
15. That the defendant breached the earnest money 
agreement by failing to complete the construction and deliver 
the premises to the plaintiffs on June 1, 1977. 
16. That the defendant breached the earnest money 
agreement by failing to convey good title and finish construction 
after the final approval of the plaintiffs' loan at Utah 
Mortgage Loan Company in November 1977. 
17. That the defendant continually failed and 
refused to go through with the closing of the sale of the 
premises and the completion of the construction of the house 
at the premises. 
18. That from May 15 through November 1977 the 
defendant Roger J. P. Marsden continually stated that he 
would complete construction on the building within a short 
period of time and at that time close on the sale of the 
premises and that the plaintiffs reasonably relied upon said 
representations and failed to take additional legal action. 
19. That from May 1977 through March 1978 plaintiffs 
with the knowledge and approval of the defendant Roger J. P. 
Marsden purchased various items of personal property for the 
premises, installed some of those items in the premises and 
did substantial work on the premises' construction to help 
effectuate the completion of construction. ***** 
/ -
ROBERTS BLACK * D IBBLEE 
-ATTOHNCYt AT LAW 
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20. That the purchase price of the earnest money 
agreement dated April 26, 1977, was in the amount of $31,352.00. 
21. That the defendants conveyed the premises to 
the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs took possession of the 
premises on July 1, 1978. 
22. That the purchase price of the premises was 
set at $39,200.00 by earnest money dated June 3, 1978, which 
amount has been fully paid for by the plaintiffs. 
23. That there was no new consideration to support 
any additional terms in the second earnest money. 
24. That the plaintiffs were required to obtain 
services of an attorney and a reasonable amount as and for 
attorney's fees for the handling of this case is $1,500.00 
25. That this judgment is against Roger J. P. 
Marsden only; however, there is no just reason for delay and 
that the judgment entered in this case should be final upon 
entry as to this defendant. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court hereby 
makes and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the eaernest money agreement dated April 
26, 1977, is a valid and binding contract between the plaintiffs 
and the defendants. 
2. That the defendant Roger J. P. Marsden committed 
fraud in the execution of the contrct and in the operation 
under its terms. 
3. That the plaintiffs are entitled to specific 
performance of the April 26, 1977, earnest money and the 
defendant Roger J. P. Marsden should be ordered to pay the 
difference in purchase price between the earnest money of 
April 26, 1977, and the final purchase price of $39,200.00. 
4. That the plaintiffs have been damaged by the 
breach of the earnest money and the fraud of the defendant 
Roger J. P. Marsden in the amount of $7,850.00 and are entitled 
to damages in said amount. 
ROBERTS SLACK * DIBBLEE 
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5. That the plaintiffs are entitled to judgment in 
the amount of $1,500.00 as and for attorney's fees. 
6. That any judgment entered in this case against 
Roger J. P. Marsden shall be a final judgment pursuant to 
rule 54(b). 
BY THE COURT 
ATTEST f^j S J? * 
' .
 CcERK
 District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was 
mailed to Graham Dodd, Attorney for Defendant, 330 South 300 
East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this day of June, 
1980. 
THOM D. ROBERTS 
ROIERTS BLACK * DIBBLEE 
ATTOWNCVS AT LAW 
wta-r TMI»D ioutN n » m 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that 4 true and correct copies of the 
foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF were mailed to Respondents by 
depositing them in the United States Mail on this 
Decemberf 1985, to the following counsel of record: 
Thorn D. Roberts 
ROBERTS & ROBERTS 
10 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
day of 
